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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of zoning in America, laws have 
operated to balance the interests of government, developers, and 
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homeowners to develop optimal living environments and maintain 
property values through a fair process. Zoning laws reflect the 
socially and culturally constructed “societal consensus” regarding 
what land uses are “normal and expected, decent, and desirable.”1 
While developers, homeowners, and governments alike encouraged 
the adoption of zoning ordinances in the early twentieth century, 
the appropriate degree of local discretion in the zoning process 
continues to be disputed to this day.2 
Conditional use permit (CUP) processes were adopted to 
enable greater discretion in zoning.3 However, increasing local 
discretion created controversial issues: How much discretion 
should a local governing body have in zoning decisions? What is an 
arbitrary decision? What is the relative authority of a zoning 
ordinance versus a comprehensive plan? Understanding the 
evolution of American zoning illuminates the continued efforts of 
state legislatures and courts to limit the discretion of local 
governing bodies in order to improve predictability and efficiency 
in the zoning process for private property owners. 
In RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that it was within a city’s discretion to deny a request for 
a CUP to expand an assisted living facility because increased traffic 
volume would “injure the neighborhood or otherwise harm the 
public health, safety, and welfare.”4 The court found that evidence 
of prospective traffic volume would exacerbate existing traffic 
concerns, as expressed by neighborhood opposition testimony.5 
However, the neighborhood concerns were not substantiated by 
additional evidence.6 
This case note begins by tracing the development of CUP 
processes as a tool for flexibility in zoning law.7 Then, this note 
 
 1.  SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA 3 (2014). 
 2.  John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A 
Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 821, 829–34 (2006) (discussing the shift of zoning regulations to local 
municipalities). 
 3.  See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND 
POLICIES 7 (1966). 
 4.  RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington (RDNT III), 861 N.W.2d 71, 77 
(Minn. 2015). 
 5.  Id. at 76–77. 
 6.  See id. at 73–74, 76–77 (discussing only traffic volume and not issues 
related to “livability,” such as on-street parking, speeding, disregarding laws, etc.). 
 7.  See infra Part II. 
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discusses the facts and the court’s rationale in the RDNT decision.8 
Next, it argues that by conflating traffic capacity and livability 
issues, the court deviated from precedent that prohibits 
neighborhood opposition testimony from being the sole basis to 
deny a CUP.9 Finally, this note concludes that the unfettered use of 
neighborhood opposition testimony creates barriers to the 
development of critical services for vulnerable Minnesotans and 
undermines a process intended to balance property interests.10 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW 
A. The Emergence of Zoning Laws: Agrarian Idealism, Urbanization, 
and the Rise of Efficient Municipal Land Use Regulation 
America’s revered agrarian past—which idealized low-density, 
autonomous living—helped establish the single-family residential 
district as a driving force in modern municipal law. Prior to the 
American industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, only six 
percent of Americans lived in cities.11 American agrarianism was 
held in such high esteem that it “became a philosophy, a 
quintessential aspiration that defined what was most virtuous in the 
American character and what distinguished the new republic from 
the European autocracies.”12 
As America urbanized, the detached single-family home 
emerged as the ideal form of American housing, which maintained 
a legacy of “individual autonomy, restless mobility, the turning of 
nature into property, and private spatial conquests.”13 The 
industrial revolution upset America’s agrarian ideal, forced rural 
 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part V. 
 11.  See HIRT, supra note 1, at 117 (citing JOHN M. LEVY, CONTEMPORARY URBAN 
PLANNING 9 (10th ed. 2013)). 
 12.  Id. at 113. Even more, there was a perception that land was a “limitless 
natural resource that was physically and culturally vacant” and “could and should 
be divided and mastered by individuals who were exercising their ‘natural’ rights 
in order to improve their material situation.” Id. at 115. 
 13.  Id. In contrast to other countries, American culture uniquely constructed 
the detached single-family home as the ideal housing form and fervently protects 
it through preserving the low-density, single-family residential zoning district. Id. at 
7 (stating that from an international point of view, the “omnipresent” single-family 
residential district is an “international rarity, historically and today”). 
3
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residents into cities, and prompted early suburbanization.14 
Between 1800 and 1900, America’s urban population “increased 
from 6 to 40 percent of the country’s total population.”15 In 
response to growing urban nuisances, affluent city dwellers fled 
cities for country homes in the suburbs.16 In effect, suburbanization 
was a form of private zoning; it spatially separated desirable from 
undesirable uses for wealthy residents.17 However, the advent of 
automobiles and buses helped challenge suburban isolation and 
increased the use of restrictive covenants18 to protect the home 
values and the comfort of wealthy residents.19 
In addition to restrictive covenants, city codes and nuisance 
laws helped form the legal “building blocks for municipal proto-
zoning regulations” in America.20 City codes regulated water supply, 
sanitation, and housing.21 Nuisance laws “protect[ed] citizens only 
against indisputable material harm [that] stemm[ed] from 
excessive pollution and health hazards.”22 Restrictive covenants, city 
 
 14.  Id. at 116–17. 
 15.  Id. at 117 (stating that Chicago, for example, “grew from 30,000 people 
in 1850 to over a million by 1890”). 
 16.  Id. at 118. As undesirable neighbors began to crowd affluent urban 
residents, the wealthy grew intolerant and moved to the suburbs. Id. at 117. 
 17.  William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its 
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 321 (2004). 
 18.  Restrictive covenants served as a pre-zoning, parcel-specific form of 
restricting private use of land. An example of this private enforcement of separate 
land uses is the use of legal racial covenants by homeowners that was in place until 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Racial restrictive covenants, for example, 
segregated cities by restricting the sale of property to minority populations. HIRT, 
supra note 1, at 131. 
 19.  Fischel, supra note 17, at 326. As buses connected cities to suburbs, 
commuters could deviate from streetcar lines and move into suburban 
neighborhoods. Id. at 320 (“[A] crucial precondition for zoning was the spread of 
a mechanically powered, intra-urban transportation system.”). 
 20.  HIRT, supra note 1, at 130; accord 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF 
ZONING § 1:12, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) (claiming that nuisance law 
“had developed a broad pattern of restraint, and public control of private land 
through legislative use of the police power was not uncommon”); see also 1 ARDEN 
H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1:1, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2015) (discussing the forms in which land use issues could 
be addressed historically, including nuisance litigation, restrictive covenants, 
special-purpose regulations, and building codes, and noting that these forms still 
exist today). 
 21.  HIRT, supra note 1, at 118. 
 22.  Id. at 119. However, unlike zoning, nuisance laws did not address the 
4
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codes, and nuisance laws each served as pre-zoning restrictions on 
private use. However, unlike zoning regulations, which sought to 
regulate private use at the community level, each of these 
restrictions limited private use on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Enabling Statutes: Enabling “American-Style” Zoning 
The emergence of zoning laws in America fulfilled the growing 
demand to efficiently regulate land use at the community level.23 
American states began to experiment with zoning laws in the 1910s 
by enabling local and regional governments to regulate land use.24 
In 1915, Minnesota enacted its first “zoning” law, which “allowed 
cities of the first class to create exclusive residential districts 
through the use of eminent domain.”25 However, zoning that was 
comprehensive, in terms of its inclusion of the whole city, first 
emerged in New York City in 1916.26 Following the passage of New 
 
“more ephemeral aspects of urban life,” such as views, light, beauty, and 
preservation. Id.  
 23.  See Fischel, supra note 17, at 320–25. 
 24.  See id. at 319. While the rapid spread of zoning laws may be attributed to 
the broad public appeal of protecting the single-family home, developers also led 
the zoning movement. For example, developers of large-scale residential 
subdivisions in southern California led the movement to adopt zoning laws in Los 
Angeles because “covenants were insufficient to protect their property’s value 
from incompatible uses on their borders.” Id. at 323–24. Even more, “[a]s 
planning historian Christine Boyer points out, zoning was seen as a way to provide 
‘an insurance policy that the single-family homeowner’s investment would be 
protected in stable neighbourhood communities.’” Id. at 324 (quoting M.C. 
BOYER, DREAMING THE RATIONAL CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 148 
(1983)). 
 25.  Jean L. Coleman & Suzanne Sutro Rhees, Where Land and Water Meet: 
Opportunities for Integrating Minnesota Water and Land Use Planning Statutes for Water 
Sustainability, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 920, 935 (2013) (citing Act of Apr. 16, 
1915, ch. 128, § 1, 1915 Minn. Laws 180, 180). “Property owners in those districts 
who wanted to use their property for another use, such as a commercial use or an 
apartment building, had their right to develop for such uses taken by the city 
through eminent domain, and were paid just compensation for their lost 
development rights.” Id. 
 26.  Fischel, supra note 17, at 318–19 (citing S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 
(1969)). Other cities also formed similar ordinances around the same time. Id. 
The concept of comprehensive zoning arose from German law. See HIRT, supra 
note 1, at 71. At the time, Germany was seen as the “most advanced society in 
terms of municipal administration.” Id. In fact, Germany had “experimented with 
urban building codes and with rules restricting the location of certain activities to 
certain areas of town for a very long time.” Id.; see also George W. Liebmann, The 
5
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York’s ordinance, eight more cities adopted zoning ordinances in 
1916.27 
States delegate the authority to zone through enabling 
legislation.28 In 1924, the United States Department of Commerce 
created the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).29 The Act 
helped states enable local zoning codes by serving as a “blueprint 
for local municipalities to enact zoning laws” and “showing 
municipalities how to enact and amend zoning ordinances, as well 
as how to authorize a zoning commission to propose the proper 
legislation for zoning.”30 
In 1928, the United States Department of Commerce 
published the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA).31 The 
SCPEA served as a “companion piece to the SZEA” and required a 
“master plan for the physical development of the municipality.”32 
The SZEA and the SCPEA differed primarily in relation to the role 
of comprehensive planning. The SZEA required that zoning 
ordinances “shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”33 
 
Modernization of Zoning: Enabling Act Revision as a Means to Reform, 23 URB. LAW. 1, 9 
(1991). 
 27.  Fischel, supra note 17, at 319. 
 28.  Philip L. Fraietta, Contract and Conditional Zoning Without Romance: A 
Public Choice Analysis, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1923, 1928 (2013) (“[M]unicipalities 
themselves do not have police power. Police power is reserved for the state and 
not for its political subdivisions. Thus, a municipality can only exercise power 
‘when it has specifically or impliedly received a delegation of such power from the 
state.’” (citations omitted)). 
 29.  JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 
PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 3:6 (1998). The federal government 
revised the SZEA in 1926. Steven D. Villavaso, Planning Enabling Legislation in 
Louisiana: A Retrospective Analysis, 45 LOY. L. REV. 655, 658 (1999). 
 30.  Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2012). See generally Ruth Knack, Stuart Meck & 
Israel Stollman, The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning Acts of the 
1920s, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Feb. 1996, at 3–4 (providing insight into 
President Herbert Hoover’s interest in urban planning and zoning laws). 
 31.  Salkin, supra note 30, at 267. 
 32.  Id. (quoting AM. PLANNING ASS’N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE 
GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE        
§ 7-110 (2002)). 
 33.  Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 HARV. L. 
REV. 1154, 1156 (1955). Interestingly, planning consultant Harald Bartholomew, 
who reviewed a draft of the SZEA created this wording when he recommended the 
wording be changed from “well-considered plan” to “comprehensive city plan.” 
Knack, supra note 30, at 5. Further, Bartholomew stated that “[z]oning is an 
6
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The SCPEA took planning a step further by requiring that a 
comprehensive plan be followed in order to improve consistency 
and limit local discretion in the application of local zoning 
ordinances.34 Since the 1920s, the development of zoning and 
planning has been entwined, but the exact relationship between 
the two is still contested.35 
By the 1930s, the enabling acts fueled the popular demand for 
zoning and helped spread zoning legislation to almost all states.36 
In 1926, sixty-eight cities had adopted zoning ordinances.37 
Between 1926 and 1936, 1,246 more municipalities across the 
country established zoning ordinances.38 Zoning ordinances spread 
across American municipalities rapidly; scholars have described 
them as a “fad”39 and even a “dance craze[].”40 Developers wanted 
zoning because it “protected the borders of covenanted land,” 
which helped “induce homeowners to invest their savings in a 
large, undiversified asset.”41 Homeowners wanted zoning because it 
protected the value of what was likely their largest financial 
 
essential part of the city plan” and “ought never to be considered separately” in 
discussing the relationship between the Zoning Commission and a city plan 
commission. Id.  
 34.  1 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 14:2–:3 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING AND PLANNING, STANDARD CITY PLANNING 
ENABLING ACT (1928)) (discussing the SCPEA’s purpose of responding to concerns 
from the implementation of SZEA and overreaching discretion of local authorities 
in the zoning process). 
 35.  Id. § 14:2; see also RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 87 (Minn. 2015) (Anderson, 
J., concurring). In questioning the authority of comprehensive plans, Justice 
Anderson wrote: “Our more recent cases have further confused matters by 
explicitly authorizing use of comprehensive plans when making decisions on 
conditional use applications, demonstrating an increased deference to 
municipalities that is seemingly at odds with our holding in Zylka.” Id.  
 36.  Salkin, supra note 30, at 267 (“By 1930, forty-seven states had adopted 
zoning enabling legislation. Thirty-five states adopted enabling legislation based 
on the SZEA, and ten states used the SCPEA.”) (citations omitted); Christopher 
Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 
1232–33 (2009); see also Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer Bragar, Recent Developments in 
Comprehensive Planning, 46 URB. LAW. 685, 685–86 n.4 (2014) (stating that while 
seventy-five percent of states adopted the SZEA model, only fifty percent of states 
adopted the SCPEA model). 
 37.  Fischel, supra note 17, at 319. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 5. 
 40.  WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 213 (2001). 
 41.  Fischel, supra note 17, at 324–26. 
7
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investment.42 Municipalities wanted zoning because it promoted the 
tax base by “encouraging commerce while making sure that it did 
not adversely affect home values and other components of the tax 
base.”43 
Minnesota enabled county and township zoning through state 
legislation in 1929.44 Today, two enabling acts govern zoning and 
planning authority in Minnesota: the County Planning Act, passed 
in 1959,45 and the Municipal Planning Act, passed in 1965.46 The 
1965 Municipal Planning Act expanded the authority of 
comprehensive plans to provide a “means of guiding future 
development of land.”47 Additionally, the Metropolitan Land 
Planning Act of 1976 defined the “structure of planning for 
counties and local governments in the seven-county metropolitan 
area.”48 While planning act amendments in 1985 limited the role of 
comprehensive plans, the 1995 and 1997 amendments expanded 
 
 42.  FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 30; Fischel, supra note 17, at 327–28 (“Having 
staked their savings in their communities’ character, home-owners became a major 
force in local politics. They supported zoning, which had originally been proposed 
by homebuilding developers, and they made their homes the primary object to be 
protected.”). 
 43.  Fischel, supra note 17, at 324.  
 44.  Act of Apr. 12, 1929, ch. 176, § 1, 1929 Minn. Laws 172, 172 (repealed 
1965); see also Coleman & Rhees, supra note 25, at 936 (stating that towns located 
within counties with populations over 450,000 people could vote to decide 
whether zoning should be adopted at the municipal level). Following this initial 
enabling legislation, the “Great Depression and World War II set back real estate 
development, so the full impact of zoning was not felt until after World War II.” 
Fischel, supra note 17, at 328. 
 45.  Coleman & Rhees, supra note 25, at 936 (citing MINN. STAT. § 394.21 
(2010 & Supp. 2011)). 
 46.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 462.12 (2010)).  
 47.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 82 (Minn. 2015) (Anderson, J., concurring) 
(citing Act of May 22, 1965, ch. 670, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 995) (providing the 
legislative history of comprehensive planning laws in Minnesota).  
 48.  Coleman & Rhees, supra note 25, at 936 (citing Act of Apr. 2, 1976, ch. 
127, 1976 Minn. Laws 292). As of 2014, the Twin Cities metropolitan area has a 
population of 2,979,343. Community Profile for Twin Cities Region (7-county), 
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, http://stats.metc.state.mn.us/profile/detail.aspx 
?c=R11000 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016). The metropolitan area is comprised of seven 
counties: Anoka County, Carver County, Dakota County, Hennepin County, 
Ramsey County, Scott County, and Washington County. Community Profiles, 
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, http://stats.metc.state.mn.us/profile/Default.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2016). Bloomington, a suburb of Minneapolis, is located in 
Hennepin County. Id. 
8
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the role of comprehensive plans.49 Since 1997, the legislature has 
trended towards elevating the role of comprehensive planning in 
the zoning process.50 
C. Constitutionalizing Zoning: Rigidity and Frustration with Euclidean 
Zoning and the Rise of Conditional Use Permit Laws as a Tool for 
Flexible Zoning 
The first challenge to Minnesota’s emerging zoning codes was 
in the 1925 case of Beery v. Houghton.51 In Beery, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court considered whether a Minneapolis zoning 
ordinance unconstitutionally restricted development of a four-
family apartment building in a district zoned for single-family 
homes.52 The court held that the city code was constitutional under 
the general police powers of the state and determined that the 
apartment unit contradicted municipal efforts to improve living 
conditions in the city.53 Notably, Beery helped establish the 
constitutional source for zoning power as distinct from the power 
 
 49.  See RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 83.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  164 Minn. 146, 147, 204 N.W. 569, 569 (1925). 
 52.  Id. at 147–50, 204 N.W. at 569–70 (“By the comprehensive zoning 
ordinance of Minneapolis, a district is created in which the erection of four-family 
flat buildings is prohibited . . . . Whether the ordinance is constitutional is the 
question . . . . With the crowding of population in the cities, there is an active 
insistence upon the establishment of residential districts from which annoying 
occupations, and buildings undesirable to the community, are excluded.”). 
 53.  Id. at 151, 204 N.W. at 570–71. In Beery, the court quotes Justice Holt 
from a 1919 opinion:  
Our elaborate Housing Code of 1917 is an illustration of an effort on 
the part of the state, through the exercise of the police power, to so 
regulate the construction of buildings that living conditions shall be 
better . . . . It must be admitted that owners of land in congested cities 
have of late, through selfish and unworthy motives, put it to such use 
that serious inconvenience and loss results to other landowners in the 
neighborhood . . . . [I]t is readily seen that if a home is built on such a 
lot and thereafter three-story apartments extending to the lot line are 
constructed on both sides of the home it becomes almost unlivable and 
its value utterly destroyed. Not only that, but the construction of such 
apartments or other like buildings in a territory of individual homes 
depreciates very much the values in the whole territory. 
Id. at 149, 204 N.W. at 570 (quoting State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 18–19, 174 
N.W. 159, 161–62 (1919)).  
9
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of eminent domain.54 Operating through a state’s police powers, 
zoning regulations may constitute a regulatory taking, but not 
necessarily.55 
A year later, in the landmark decision Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co.,56 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
constitutionality of zoning ordinances.57 In a facial challenge,58 the 
Court applied rational basis review59 and held that zoning 
ordinances were presumptively constitutional60 unless the 
ordinance was “arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”61 
In effect, “Euclidean zoning”62 provided predictable and efficient 
 
 54.  Id. at 147, 204 N.W. at 569. (“The public use, which sustains the taking of 
property under the power of eminent domain upon compensation paid, differs 
from the public interest or welfare which justifies the restriction of the individual 
in the use of his property without compensation.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Mark S. Dennison & Steven M. Silverberg, Overview of Regulatory 
Takings Law, in 31 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 2, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 
2015). 
 56.  272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
 57.  Id. (“[A]s it must be said before the ordinance can be declared 
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, 
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”); see also Fischel, supra note 17, at 319 (“Euclid’s victory cleared the way 
for zoning in almost all of the state courts, which had been about evenly split on 
the constitutionality of zoning up to 1926.”).  
 58.  While Euclid determined that zoning ordinances were constitutional in 
general, the Court held in Nectow v. City of Cambridge that zoning ordinances may 
be unconstitutional as applied. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).  
 59.  In its support for regulation, Euclid may be viewed as an anomaly in 
Lochner era substantive due process interpretation, where the Court often struck 
down regulation of private business. See Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, 
Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 432, 459 (2005). But see Nadav 
Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the 
Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 112 (2011) (citing ROBERT 
G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 87–90, 101–05 (4th ed. 2005) 
(arguing that in the zoning context, the Lochner court was more pragmatic than is 
often credited). 
 60.  See Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 741 (2004) (contending Euclid shifted the presumption 
for noncompliant uses from legitimate to illegitimate). 
 61.  Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
 62.  83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 98, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 
2015) (“‘Euclidean zoning’ describes the early zoning concept of separating 
incompatible land uses through the establishment of fixed legislative rules . . . .”). 
10
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land use regulations by simply defining uses as conforming and 
nonconforming to a zoning district’s “appropriate” use.63 
Euclidean zoning’s rigid structure of conforming and 
nonconforming uses provided predictability for developers, but 
frustrated municipalities. With variances as the only available device 
to accommodate nonconforming uses,64 cities were unable to 
develop important public amenities and services for residents.65 In 
response to these problems, by the 1960s, tools for flexibility in the 
zoning process had expanded, local discretion had grown, and 
uncertainty in the zoning process had increased.66 
CUPs, also referred to as special-use permits or special 
exceptions, were developed to provide more flexibility67 and 
discretion for municipalities after World War II.68 CUP laws enabled 
 
 63.  See Shoked, supra note 59, at 143 (“Euclid placed the right to security in 
landholding, to quiet enjoyment of the homestead, at the forefront—at the 
expense of free exploitation of property and commercial expansion.”); see also 
Claeys, supra note 60, at 741 (“Each local owner los[t] substantial freedom to 
control the use of his own parcel of land, but gain[ed] the opportunity to vote on 
how his neighbors ought to use their properties.”).  
 64.  Variances are a “distinct remedy” from CUPs. 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AM. 
LAW. ZONING § 13:2 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). Unlike 
CUPs, variances relate to noncomforming uses. Id. In other words, “[v]ariances are 
essentially an authorization to deviate from the terms of an applicable zoning 
ordinance.” Id. 
 65.  Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for Zoning That Is 
Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 389 (2004) 
(“This rigidity of Euclidean zoning came at the expense of flexibility, allowing for 
little modification or adoption of regulations to particular uses within zones. 
Moreover, the assumptions underlying Euclidean zoning were incorrect. 
Euclidean zoning underestimated the effects of the dynamism of a growing 
economy and rapidly changing technologies in private preferences and municipal 
needs, and it overestimated the ability of officials to anticipate market demand for 
new uses.”).  
 66.  Fraietta, supra note 28, at 1927 (“Although Euclidean zoning provided 
for changes and variances, it was envisioned that discretionary review of individual 
proposed use would be the ‘exception’ rather than the rule and that zoning 
restrictions would be uniform for each kind of building in each district.”). 
 67.  While CUPs are one device that developed to promote flexibility in 
zoning, other tools that have developed include: “floating zones, cluster zoning, 
planned unit developments (PUDs), transfer of development rights (TDRs), and 
‘performance zoning.’” RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, 
LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 197 (3d ed. 2014). Before these devices existed, the only 
way to address nonconforming uses were through amendments and variances. Id. 
 68.  See BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 5; see also 1 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 20, § 
1:14; Green, supra note 65, at 388 (arguing that the CUP process was more 
11
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localities to permit certain uses in specific areas—typically for 
hospitals, schools, landfills, or golf courses—but held development 
for these uses contingent upon approval by a local governing 
body.69 Because these uses often raised issues with traffic, noise, 
odor, property values, and population density, the CUP process 
allowed local governing bodies to consider each use on a case-by-
case basis to balance the interests of the applicant and surrounding 
property owners.70 Unlike variances, conditional uses were seen as 
allowable uses, but only if certain conditions were met to ensure 
compatibility with surrounding uses, such as the omnipresent low-
density, single-family residential district.71 
When the CUP process started to gain popularity in American 
zoning, the process was met with “much criticism” because many 
believed it ran “counter to the principle that zoning is a specific, 
not discretionary, form of control.”72 Initial objections to the CUP 
related to the lack of specific standards for conditional uses.73 
These complaints encouraged legislation to require specifications 
for how a CUP application determination would be made.74 
 
efficient than rezoning, which was a more “cumbersome legislative process”); 
Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local 
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 879 (1983); Patricia E. Salkin, From Euclid to 
Growing Smart: The Transformation of the American Local Land Use Ethic into Local 
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 118 (2002). 
 69.  See 3 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 20, § 61:4; see also 3 SALKIN, supra note 
64, § 18:62 (discussing special-use permits for nursing homes and assisted-living 
facilities). 
 70.  Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 195–96, 167 N.W.2d 45, 48–49 
(1969); Amoco Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 395 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
 71.  BEVERLY J. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1961) 
(“[W]hereas variances are granted in order to save the constitutionality of the 
ordinance in cases where its operation would cause special hardship, the 
exception is intended to further the needs of the community, and not to alleviate 
the hardship of individual owners.”). 
 72.  JOHN DELAFONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (2d ed. 
1969). But see POOLEY, supra note 71, at 66 (arguing that the exceptions actually 
reduced the “amount of discretion in the hands of the zoning board of appeals, 
since that body merely has to find whether, as a matter of fact, the application is 
properly within the scope of the ordinance’s provisions with respect to the 
granting of special exceptions, and whether the proposed development will accord 
with the requirements of the master plan”). 
 73.  DELAFONS, supra note 72, at 51–52 (attributing the demand for precise 
specifications to “American distrust for bureaucratic power”). 
 74.  See id. 
12
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/15
9 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:57 PM 
332 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:320 
In Zylka v. City of Crystal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that a city only had the authority to deny a CUP that was not in 
accordance with the city’s zoning ordinance or the public’s general 
welfare, and a city had to demonstrate that the decision was not 
made arbitrarily.75 According to the court, a “special-use-permit” 
was “an authorized zoning tool designed not merely for nuisance 
control but to provide municipalities with broad latitude to meet 
the changing problems of land-use control . . . .”76 Although the 
zoning enabling statute did not “expressly confer upon 
municipalities the power to provide for special-use permits, such 
power [was] clearly implicit” in Minnesota Statutes section 462.357, 
subdivision 1.77 The statute read: “For the purpose of promoting 
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, a municipality 
may by ordinance regulate . . . the uses of land for trade [and] 
industry . . . and may establish standards and procedures regulating such 
uses.”78 
Zylka sent the message to developers that municipalities had 
broad discretion to deny a proposed use through a CUP denial. 
However, the case was also a reminder to local authorities that a 
decision must be made on some basis in line with the general 
welfare. Subsequent case law and legislation worked to provide 
developers with greater predictability and efficiency in obtaining 
CUPs by defining appropriate municipal discretion. 
In 1982, thirteen years after Zylka, the Minnesota legislature 
passed its first CUP legislation, codified in Minnesota Statutes 
section 462.3595. The statute (1) affirmed municipal power to 
designate conditional uses,79 (2) granted municipal discretion to 
grant or deny a CUP, (3) placed the burden on the CUP applicant 
to demonstrate that the “standards and criteria stated in the 
ordinance [would] be satisfied,”80 and (4) limited municipal 
discretion by requiring “standards and criteria” for conditional uses 
 
 75.  Zylka, 283 Minn. at 196, 167 N.W.2d at 49. 
 76.  Id. at 196–97, 167 N.W.2d at 49. 
 77.  Id. at 196, 167 N.W.2d at 49.  
 78.  MINN. STAT. § 462.357, subdiv. 1 (1968) (emphasis added).  
 79.  MINN. STAT. § 462.3595 (1982). Specifically, the statute emphasized the 
ability of municipalities to “designate certain types of developments, including 
planned unit developments, and certain land development activities as conditional 
uses under zoning regulations.” Id. at subdiv. 1. 
 80.  Id. at subdiv. 1. 
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and variances.81 To decrease the discretion of local authorities, the 
statute required that “standards and criteria shall include both 
general requirements for all conditional uses, and insofar as 
practicable, requirements specific to each designated conditional 
use.”82 The bill passed through the legislature without dispute.83 
D. The Role of the Judiciary in the Zoning Process: Standard of Review 
While a city has broad discretionary power to deny a CUP, as 
determined in Zylka,84 the permit process is considered quasi-
judicial and courts may review denials.85 It is the applicant’s burden 
to demonstrate that the “standards and criteria stated in the 
ordinance will be satisfied” by a proposed use.86 However, the 
“absence of more express standards makes denial of a special-use 
permit more, not less, vulnerable to a finding of arbitrariness.”87 A 
court may reverse a decision if the governing body acted 
“unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously.”88 In deference to the 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 83.  The 1982 Journal of the Senate, in its description of the bill, stated that it 
was “[a] bill for an act relating to local government . . . requiring notice; 
authorizing towns to plan; providing for [legal] standards and criteria for 
conditional uses and variances . . . .” S. JOURNAL, 72d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4141 
(Minn. 1982). This author went to the Minnesota Historical Society’s Gale Family 
Library in Saint Paul, Minnesota, to conduct a legislative history; the Commerce 
Committee minutes do not indicate that the CUP section of the bill was ever 
contested or revised during the 1982 session.  
 84.  See BECA of Alexandria, L.L.P. v. Cty. of Douglas Bd. of Comm’rs, 607 
N.W.2d 459, 463 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that a court “may not substitute its 
judgment” for a local governing body “if there is a legally sufficient reason for the 
decision, even if it would have reached a different conclusion”). 
 85.  See BBY Inv’rs v. City of Maplewood, 467 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991) (arguing that court may review the CUP denial because the process is 
“quasi-judicial,” meaning that a local governing body must apply specific standards 
of a local ordinance to a particular proposed use, which may be evaluated by the 
court to ensure it was done correctly). 
 86.  See, e.g., Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 763 
(Minn. 1982); Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 303 
Minn. 79, 84, 226 N.W.2d 306, 309 (1975), superceded by statute, MINN. STAT.            
§ 462.3595 (2014), as recognized in RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015); 
Roselawn Cemetery v. City of Roseville, 689 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2004). 
 87.  Hay v. Twp. of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 6, 206 N.W.2d 19, 23 (1973).  
 88.  Schwardt v. Cty. of Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 2003); see also 
Dead Lake Ass’n v. Otter Tail Cty., 695 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Minn. 2005). 
14
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/15
9 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:57 PM 
334 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:320 
legislature,89 a court’s role is only to interpret a zoning ordinance 
and ensure that a local governing body “was not mistaken as to the 
applicable law.”90 Zoning ordinances must be interpreted by their 
“plain and ordinary meaning and in favor of the property owner.”91 
A court considers (1) whether a city provides “legally sufficient” 
reasons to deny a CUP and, if so, (2) whether the reasons have a 
“factual basis.”92 
Traffic concerns may be considered a “legally sufficient” 
reason to deny a CUP.93 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has emphasized that “traffic, in itself, is not injurious or harmful,” 
and increased traffic is “far from the creation of a traffic hazard.”94 
Even more, courts have held that zoning ordinances should not be 
used “as a primary means of regulating traffic or [an attempt] to 
reduce traffic congestion.”95 For traffic concerns “to be considered 
 
 89.  But cf. Big Lake Ass’n v. Saint Louis Cty. Planning Comm’n, 761 N.W.2d 
487, 491 (Minn. 2009) (finding denials of CUPs receive less deference than 
approvals). 
 90.  Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 
(Minn. 1980); Vill. of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 98, 119 N.W.2d 809, 815 
(1962); see also Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 718 
(Minn. 1978). 
 91.  Yang v. Cty. of Carver, 660 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing 
Frank’s Nursery Sales, 295 N.W.2d at 608). 
 92.  C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981); 
Molnar v. Cty. of Carver Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997); Trisko v. City of Waite Park, 566 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating review is limited to the reasons stated by the city). 
 93.  1 SALKIN, supra note 64, § 7:9. While many zoning enabling acts in states 
borrowed “language from § 3 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,” which 
authorized “the adoption in zoning regulations which tend ‘to lessen congestion 
in the streets,’” neither Minnesota’s current enabling statute nor Minnesota’s 1965 
Municipal Zoning Act referred specifically to controlling traffic as within the 
police powers of the state. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 462.351 (2014); Act of May 22, 
1965, ch. 670, 1965 Minn. Laws 995 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 462.351 
(1966)). Minnesota’s enabling act referred to the police powers broadly by stating 
that municipalities need to “promote the public health, safety, morals and general 
welfare.” MINN. STAT. § 462.351. 
 94.  Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 303 Minn. 
79, 226 N.W.2d 306 (1975), superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 3595 (2014), as 
recognized in RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 78 (Minn. 2015) (recognizing the change to 
the burden of proof standard, but not neighborhood opposition); see also 83 AM. 
JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 845, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) (stating 
adverse impact of traffic on neighborhood may be considered, but “should not be 
given great weight”). 
 95.  1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.09, at 749 
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evidence in favor of a [CUP] denial, [traffic] concerns must be 
concrete in nature, not vague concerns about future traffic.”96 The 
testimony cannot be “general statements about congestion” or 
“anecdotal comments” regarding traffic.97 However, testimony is 
considered “concrete” if it addresses “existing, daily traffic 
problems”98 or reflects “actual observations of traffic congestion or 
potential traffic impact.”99 
Alone, neighborhood opposition testimony—based on traffic 
concerns or other potential problems—may not be considered a 
“sufficient factual basis” to deny a CUP application.100 It is 
undisputed that neighbors may express opposition.101 However, the 
weight of neighborhood opposition in the decision process is 
limited. Arguably, Minnesota has a more rigorous standard for 
neighborhood opposition cases than other states, taking a more 
“suspicious” view of neighborhood opposition.102 For instance, in 
Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held “non-specific testimony” that a 
“proposed McDonald’s pose[d] potential traffic hazards” could not 
“rebut the city engineer’s testimony that the intersection could 
handle the anticipated traffic.”103 In this ruling, the court held that 
a CUP denial “must be based on something more concrete than 
neighborhood opposition and expressions of concern for public 
safety and welfare.”104 Going even further, in Northpointe Plaza v. City 
 
(4th ed. 1996). 
 96.  RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington (RDNT I), No. 27-CV-12-791, 2012 
WL 12139702, at *9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 2012) (citing SuperAmerica Grp., 
Inc., v. City of Little Canada 539 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)); see also 
Yang, 660 N.W.2d at 833–34.  
 97.  RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington (RDNT II), No. A13-0310, 2014 WL 
30382, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2014), aff’d, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015) 
(quoting Yang, 660 N.W.2d at 834). 
 98.  SuperAmerica Grp., 539 N.W.2d at 267–68. 
 99.  Bartheld v. Cty. of Koochiching, 716 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 100.  See Yang, 660 N.W.2d at 833–34. 
 101.  See SuperAmerica Grp., 539 N.W.2d at 268. 
 102.  See Harold A. Ellis, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of 
Zoning, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 298 (1992). 
 103.  342 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984). 
 104.  Id.; see also C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 
(Minn. 1981); Luger v. City of Burnsville, 295 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Minn. 1980) 
(“Although neighborhood sentiment may be taken into consideration in any 
zoning decision, it may not constitute the sole base for granting or denying a given 
16
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of Rochester, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that 
neighborhood opposition based on traffic concerns was insufficient 
to deny a CUP to construct a gas station.105 However, in 
SuperAmerica Group, Inc., v. City of Little Canada, the court of appeals 
found that expert testimony supporting neighborhood opposition 
testimony about traffic congestion was a legally sufficient basis to 
deny a CUP.106 
The courts’ “suspicion” of neighborhood opposition testimony 
in these cases is highlighted by a comparison to the United States 
Supreme Court case City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living 
Center.107 Whereas “the Minnesota paradigm . . . seems to trigger 
presumption shifting, regardless of whether the motives of 
neighbors and decisionmakers were innocent,” Cleburne only shifts 
the burden when there is a “showing” that the denial “was 
animated by illicit motives or impermissible purposes.”108 Minnesota 
case law continues to maintain that neighborhood opposition 
alone cannot be grounds for CUP denial.109 
Additionally, if a local governing body does not adequately 
consider proposed mitigating conditions that would bring a CUP 
application into compliance with a local ordinance, a CUP denial 
may be considered arbitrary and not based on a sufficient “factual 
basis.”110 If a city bases a decision on neighborhood opposition 
testimony more than on the proposed mitigating conditions, a 
 
a permit.” (quoting Nw. Coll. v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. 
1979))).  
 105.  457 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 465 N.W.2d 686 
(Minn. 1991). 
 106.  SuperAmerica Grp., 539 N.W.2d at 268. 
 107.  Ellis, supra note 102, at 297 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). 
 108.  Id. at 297–98. 
 109.  Minnesota case law maintains that neighborhood opposition may be 
considered as a factual basis if it is concrete and specific. Furthermore, Chanhassen 
and additional cases emphasize that neighborhood opposition alone cannot be a 
factual basis for CUP denial. See infra Part IV.A. 
 110.  Compare C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 
1981) (plan to alleviate parking and traffic concerns was adequate), and Trisko v. 
City of Waite Park, 566 N.W.2d 349, 355–57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (working with 
Department of Transportation to address traffic concerns considered adequate), 
with In re Application of Stuckmayer, No. A09-30, 2009 WL 4910053, at *6 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (local board ignored a proposed condition), and 
duCharme v. Otter Tail Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A08-0529, 2009 WL 1851445, at 
*4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (local board gave no reasons for denial).  
17
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court may find a CUP denial arbitrary.111 In Tri-City Paving, Inc. v. 
Cass County Planning Commission/Board of Adjustment, for example, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that “[i]f the board’s findings 
were specific and factually supported in consideration of the 
conditions, its reasons for denial would survive our deferential 
review.”112 
Overall, Minnesota courts demonstrate a cautious approach to 
neighborhood opposition testimony serving as a “factual basis” for 
a CUP denial. Courts refuse to accept neighborhood opposition as 
(1) the sole “factual basis” for a CUP denial, and (2) the primary 
consideration over proposed mitigating conditions. 
III. THE RDNT DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
On September 27, 2011, RDNT, LLC (RDNT) applied to the 
City of Bloomington (City) for a CUP to add a three-story, sixty-
seven unit assisted living facility to its Martin Luther Care Campus 
(Campus).113 Located along the Minnesota River, “[t]he [C]ampus 
is surrounded on its east, south, and west sides by dense 
woodlands.”114 Traffic can only access the facility from the north by 
passing through a residential neighborhood.115 As a care facility, 
“the [C]ampus is designated [as a] quasi-public” use.116 The 
Campus already includes a 137-unit skilled nursing facility and a 
117-unit assisted living facility.117 According to RDNT, the 
expansion would enable transitional care residents to “age in 
 
 111.  See Tri-City Paving, Inc. v. Cass Cty. Planning Comm’n/Bd. of 
Adjustment, No. A11-2054, 2012 WL 4475742, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012). 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 72–73 (Minn. 2015). 
 114.  RDNT II, No. A13-0310, 2014 WL 30382, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 
2014), aff’d, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015). 
 115.  Id. (“Approximately 80 percent of the traffic to and from the campus is 
carried by 13th Avenue South. The remainder of the traffic to and from the 
campus is carried by East 100th Street, to the east of its intersection with 13th 
Avenue South.”). Interestingly, the Campus—built “over 50 years ago” for elder 
care—preceded the residential neighborhood, which was later built on the 
Campus’s subdivided excess land. As stated in RDNT’s reply brief, “the residents 
moved into the Campus’ neighborhood.” Appellant’s Reply Brief & Addendum at 
13, RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 71 (No. A13-0310), 2014 WL 8392639, at *13. 
 116.  RDNT II, 2014 WL 30382, at *8. 
 117.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 73. 
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place,” allowing residents to transfer into assisted living without 
leaving the Campus.118 
In November 2011, the Bloomington Planning Commission 
“unanimously voted to recommend denial of the [CUP] 
application” after neighborhood residents “voic[ed] concerns 
about increased traffic.”119 After considering the Planning 
Commission’s denial, expert traffic studies, and neighborhood 
opposition testimony, the City denied the CUP application, 
concluding that the proposed use violated the City’s 
comprehensive plan and CUP ordinance.120 The City reasoned that 
(1) the facility’s size would be “incompatible with the scale and 
character of the surrounding low density, single family 
neighborhood;” (2) the traffic volume would be “injurious or 
otherwise harmful;” and (3) RDNT’s traffic mitigation plan was 
“insufficient to avoid the injury, given the location and nature of 
the Campus.”121 
RDNT appealed to the Hennepin County District Court.122 The 
court granted summary judgment to RDNT, ruling that the City 
“misapplied certain standards, misrepresented the impact of 
certain studies, and appeared to ignore evidence to the contrary” 
for each of the reasons asserted by the City.123 Moreover, the court 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 73–74 (“By a vote of four to three, the City Council passed a 
resolution to deny RDNT’s application for a conditional use permit.”). The 
Bloomington City CUP Ordinance reads:  
The following findings must be made prior to the approval of a 
conditional use permit: (1) The proposed use is not in conflict with the 
Comprehensive Plan; (2) The proposed use is not in conflict with any 
adopted District Plan for the area; (3) The proposed use is not in 
conflict with City Code provisions; (4) The proposed use will not create 
an excessive burden on parks, schools, streets, and other public 
facilities and utilities which serve or are proposed to serve the planned 
development; and (5) The proposed use will not be injurious to the 
surrounding neighborhood or otherwise harm the public health, safety 
and welfare. 
Id. (citing BLOOMINGTON, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 21, art. V, div. A,             
§ 21.501.04(e) (2013)).  
 121.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 74–75. 
 122.  Id. at 75. 
 123.  RDNT I, No. 27-CV-12-791, 2012 WL 12139702, at *8 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 
18, 2012). 
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held that City’s denial “was based on analysis of inapplicable 
standards and improper overemphasis of certain statistics.”124 
The City appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
reversed.125 The court held that the city council acted within its 
discretion because violation of the City’s comprehensive plan and 
the City’s CUP ordinance constituted factually and legally sufficient 
reasons for a CUP denial.126 In its reversal, the court relied on two 
factors. First, the court held that the proposed expansion violated 
the City’s comprehensive plan because it constituted a “larger 
traffic generator” that was not “located adjacent to an arterial or 
collector street.”127 Second, the court determined that the increased 
traffic from the proposed expansion would disturb the “character” 
of the surrounding “low-density neighborhoods” and injure the 
general welfare of the surrounding neighborhoods, in violation of 
the comprehensive plan and CUP ordinance.128 
RDNT appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted 
review.129 On review, RDNT argued two main points of contention: 
(1) whether the record supported the conclusion that increased 
traffic “would injure the surrounding neighborhood or otherwise 
harm the public health, safety and welfare,” and (2) whether the 
City’s denial was arbitrary because the City did not “suggest or 
impose mitigating conditions” or “adequately consider RDNT’s 
proposed mitigating conditions.”130 After considering the facts and 
the law, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of 
 
 124.  Id. at *9. 
 125.  RDNT II, No. A13-0310, 2014 WL 30382, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 
2014), aff’d, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015). 
 126.  Id. at *5, *8–9. 
 127.  Id. at *4 (“The comprehensive plan does not define the term ‘larger 
traffic generator.’ The plain meaning of the word ‘larger’ connotes a comparison 
in terms of size or quantity. Thus, the city is justified in comparing the traffic 
produced by the campus with the traffic produced by the residential 
neighborhood directly north of the campus.”). 
 128.  Id. at *9 (“The [C]ity cited three specific aspects of RDNT’s expansion 
that would cause injury to the surrounding neighborhood. These three grounds 
are the same as those cited by the [C]ity with respect to the character of the 
surrounding low-density neighborhood. For the same reasons . . . stated above, we 
conclude that the city had both a legally and factually sufficient basis for denying 
RDNT’s CUP application based on concerns for the health and welfare of the 
surrounding neighborhood.”). 
 129.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 2015). 
 130.  Id. at 76, 78. 
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appeal’s decision, holding that the City acted within its discretion 
by denying RDNT a CUP.131 
B. The Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court132 limited review to 
determining whether there were “legally and factually sufficient” 
grounds to deny RDNT’s CUP based on a violation of the City’s 
CUP ordinance.133 First, the court maintained that protecting “the 
public health or safety or the general welfare of the area affected or 
the community as a whole” has long been considered a legally 
sufficient reason to deny a CUP application.134 Although suggesting 
that the “absence of more express standards makes denial of a 
special-use permit more, not less, vulnerable to a finding of 
arbitrariness,”135 the court concluded—without analysis—that 
violation of Bloomington’s CUP ordinance was a legally sufficient 
reason to deny a CUP.136 
Second, the court reasoned that there was a “sufficient factual 
basis” to conclude that the proposed use would harm the 
neighborhood because increased traffic volume would aggravate 
existing traffic problems.137 Distinguishing its decision from C.R. 
Investments, Inc. v. Village of Shoreview,138 the court found that unlike 
C.R. Investments, Inc., neighborhood testimony “gave concrete 
testimony about how the increase in traffic would exacerbate 
existing traffic conditions.”139 Specifically, the court emphasized the 
poor traffic behavior in the neighborhood: 
 
 131.  Id. at 79. 
 132.  Justice Christopher Dietzen did not partake in the court’s decision. Id. 
Justice G. Barry Anderson’s concurring opinion accepts the majority’s holding, but 
writes separately to raise concerns about “significant uncertainty in our statutory 
framework and confusion in our case law concerning the role of comprehensive 
plans.” Id. (Anderson, J., concurring). 
 133.  Id. at 75 n.3 (“Not all of the reasons stated need to be legally sufficient 
and supported by the facts in the record.” (quoting Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of 
Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 765 n.4 (Minn. 1982))).  
 134.  Id. at 76 (quoting Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196, 167 N.W.2d 
45, 49 (1969)).  
 135.  Id. (quoting Hay v. Twp. of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 6, 206 N.W.2d 19, 22–23 
(1973)). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 77. 
 138.  304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981). 
 139.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77. 
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For instance, one neighbor wrote about vehicles driving 
through crosswalks near the school, even though the 
crossing guards had their flags out. Another neighbor 
wrote about observing vehicles that sped and made U-
turns. Yet another neighbor wrote about the incredible 
amount of “traffic and noise” due to the large number of 
delivery trucks, emergency vehicles, shuttle buses, 
passenger cars, and garbage vehicles.140 
The court further distinguished its decision from C.R. 
Investments, Inc. based on the source of the neighborhood 
opposition and the degree of the traffic concern.141 In C.R. 
Investments, Inc., the court found that the “only evidence of a traffic 
control problem” was a “statement of one council member” who 
had been informed about “a problem existing at one intersection 
and his opinion that additional housing units might aggravate that 
problem.”142 However, in the present case, the court reasoned 
multiple residents raised traffic concerns at various locations.143 
Further supporting its argument that the City had a “sufficient 
factual basis,” the court distinguished its decision from Chanhassen 
Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen.144 In Chanhassen, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the CUP denial was arbitrary 
where the city engineer concluded that the “intersection could 
handle the traffic,” but neighborhood opposition “only offered 
‘non-specific testimony that the proposed [use] pose[d] potential 
traffic hazards at [an] intersection.’”145 The city engineer in the 
present case also determined the city’s “streets were not at 
capacity.”146 In contrast to the city’s arguments in Chanhassen, the 
City of Bloomington swayed the court through “specific evidence—
traffic studies, average street numbers, and neighborhood 
testimony . . . that the proposed use” would harm the general 
welfare of the neighborhood.147 The court’s reasoning linked 
projected increased traffic to negative impact on the 
 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id.; see C.R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325. 
 142.  C.R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325. 
 143.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77. 
 144.  Id. (citing Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 
N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984)) 
 145.  Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d at 340. 
 146.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77. 
 147.  Id. 
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neighborhood’s future livability.148 The court held that although “a 
street could physically handle more traffic,” that did not mean “the 
neighborhood or the public could handle more traffic.”149 
Finally, the court rejected RDNT’s argument that the City 
arbitrarily found RDNT’s proposed mitigating conditions to be 
insufficient.150 In its reasoning, the court again distinguished its 
decision from C.R. Investments Inc., where the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held a village council’s decision arbitrary when it ignored the 
reasonable condition of adding “turn-around areas in . . . 
driveways” that would eliminate a traffic hazard.151 In considering 
the added condition that eliminated the impact of increased traffic, 
the C.R. Investments Inc. court held that it could no longer find 
“evidence warranting an inference that the traffic aggravation 
would be ‘substantial.’”152 In RDNT, however, the court concluded 
that the traffic studies examining increased traffic volume 
“adequately considered” the proposed conditions by RDNT and 
showed that even with the conditions, traffic volume would still 
increase and therefore the conditions would “not alleviate the 
traffic concerns.”153 The court did not differentiate between 
mitigating conditions that would decrease the volume of traffic and 
conditions that would minimize the impact of increased traffic. 
Therefore, the court held that the City acted within its 
discretion to deny RDNT’s CUP application because the City had a 
“legally and factually sufficient” reason.154 
 
 148.  Id. (“Not unreasonably, the City determined that street capacity alone 
was not dispositive as to whether an increase in traffic injures the neighborhood or 
otherwise harms the public health, safety, and welfare.”). 
 149.  Id. (paraphrasing a city planner, “[T]his is not a capacity issue, it is a 
livability issue.”). 
 150.  Id. at 78 (stating that section 462.3595 placed the burden on the 
applicant to show compliance with the ordinance and the City did not have the 
burden of proposing mitigating conditions). 
 151.  C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981) 
(“The council had been informed, however, that the road could accommodate 
increased traffic, and appellant can eliminate any hazard from automobile backing 
onto the road by furnishing turn-around areas in the driveways.”). 
 152.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 78 (quoting C.R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325). 
 153.  Id. at 78–79. 
 154.  Id. at 72.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
In error, the Minnesota Supreme Court (1) solely relied on 
neighborhood opposition to conclude that the traffic from the 
proposed use would harm the surrounding neighborhood’s 
livability and (2) ignored material mitigating conditions proposed 
by RDNT to improve traffic impact. First, despite the court’s 
emphasis that the problem was not capacity, but livability, only the 
neighborhood opposition testimony addressed livability.155 Second, 
the court failed to consider RDNT’s proposed conditions to 
minimize the impact of increased traffic by only interpreting 
conditions that would minimize traffic volume.156 
Consequently, the court broadly expanded Minnesota law 
regarding what may be considered a “factually sufficient” basis for 
denying a CUP based on injurious traffic, lowering the burden of 
proof for municipalities and disregarding potential public value of 
a proposed use. The impact of this expanded municipal discretion 
in development may present undue barriers to the development of 
important quasi-public uses, such as care facilities for Minnesota’s 
expanding elderly population.157 The court’s holding enforced a 
process that does not adequately consider the residential needs of 
the aging versus the needs of the powerful lobby of single-family 
homeowners. By conflating traffic impact and traffic volume, the 
court unfettered neighborhood opposition based on traffic 
concerns and deviated from the state’s rigorous standard in 
considering neighborhood opposition. 
A. Neighborhood Opposition to Traffic Impact 
Even accepting the court’s conclusion that the neighborhood 
opposition evidence was “concrete” and based on existing, daily 
traffic problems, the court cannot rely on these statements alone to 
support the claim that traffic would harm the neighborhood.158 In 
 
 155.  Id. at 77. 
 156.  Id. at 78–79; see C. R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325. 
 157.  QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table 
/PST045214/27 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (showing that from 2010 to 2014, the 
number of Minnesotans over the age of sixty-five increased from 12.9 to 14.3 
percent).  
 158.  See Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 
N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984) (holding a valid denial of a CUP requires more 
than non-specific testimony, such as mere neighborhood opposition or concern 
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RDNT, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that expert traffic 
studies adequately considered the increase in traffic and the 
inability of the proposed mitigating conditions to alleviate the 
amount of traffic.159 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not 
consider whether the expert traffic studies, or other evidence, 
confirmed the neighborhood observations regarding the current 
impact of traffic.160 
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished its decision from 
Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen to 
demonstrate the authority of the neighborhood opposition 
testimony.161 The court distinguished the cases based on the degree 
of strength of neighborhood opposition testimony and expert 
testimony.162 In Chanhassen, the neighborhood opposition was weak, 
based on “non-specific” concerns for the general welfare.163 The 
minimal expert testimony regarding the street’s capacity overrode 
the weaker neighborhood opposition testimony.164 However, in 
RDNT, the neighborhood opposition was strong, based on multiple 
accounts of specific concerns about public safety and nuisance.165 
Unlike in Chanhassen, the extensive expert testimony regarding 
traffic volume in RDNT did not override the well-asserted 
neighborhood opposition because, according to the court, any 
increase in volume would exacerbate existing livability concerns.166 
Chanhassen established that neighborhood opposition may be 
considered if the testimony is concrete and specific. However, 
Chanhassen did not help clarify the type and degree of expert 
testimony needed to support or deny a CUP. Subsequent case law 
 
for public safety). 
 159.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 73–74. 
 160.  See id. at 77 (explaining that the City appropriately relied on “traffic 
studies, average street numbers, and neighborhood testimony—to conclude that 
the proposed use would nonetheless injure or otherwise harm the 
neighborhood”). 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  See id. 
 163.  See id. 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See id. at 79 (“Even if URS’s estimates regarding traffic generation and 
the [Transportation Demand Management Program’s] effectiveness were 
accurate, the expansion would still add over 100 daily trips. Thus, the City had a 
reasonable factual basis to determine that the proposal would not alleviate the 
traffic concerns.”). 
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helps clarify the relationship between neighborhood opposition 
and expert testimony; the Minnesota Supreme Court did not 
analyze this law.167 
Even if traffic testimony is specific, Minnesota courts maintain 
a “suspicious” attitude toward neighborhood opposition.168 
Although “municipalities may consider bordering residents’ 
concerns to zoning issues,” the neighborhood opposition needs to 
be “specific and backed by other concrete evidence.”169 In other 
words, the law states that if there is neighborhood opposition 
testimony about a given concern, there needs to be something to 
substantiate the specific claims. In this respect, RDNT departs from 
precedent. For example, in SuperAmerica Group, Inc. v. City of Little 
Canada, expert testimony directly confirmed residents’ observations 
about long delays resulting from existing traffic congestion at one 
intersection.170 In SuperAmerica, the court focused on the expert’s 
conclusions regarding the impact of the traffic congestion—not 
traffic volume alone—to conclude the proposed use would harm 
the public’s general welfare.171 
However, in RDNT, neighborhood opposition was the sole 
evidence of traffic harming the neighborhood in the court’s 
rationale.172 This represents a misstep in Minnesota law 
surrounding CUPs. Although neighborhood opposition may be 
 
 167.  Yang v. Cty. of Carver, 660 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(allowing cities to consider neighborhood opposition if it is based on concrete 
information). 
 168.  See Ellis, supra note 102, at 297–98.  
 169.  Hanson v. Cty. of Carver Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A05-2047, 2006 WL 
2598283, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Swanson 
v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 1988); Yang, 660 N.W.2d at 
833 (claiming that the neighborhood opposition testimony was “insufficiently 
concrete to substantiate a finding that the proposed use would create excess 
traffic”); SuperAmerica Grp., Inc. v. City of Little Canada, 539 N.W.2d 264, 267 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 170.  539 N.W.2d at 268 (describing expert testimony that supported claims, 
albeit potentially exaggerated claims, of traffic congestion at the intersection: “(1) 
making a left turn from the site onto Little Canada Road was extremely difficult, 
and often impossible, due to traffic congestion; (2) many vehicles had to wait two 
cycles at the stoplight before completing a turn . . .”). 
 171.  Id. It is unclear whether the gas station proposed any mitigating 
conditions to alleviate the burden of increased traffic; mitigating conditions were 
not discussed in the opinion. See id. 
 172.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 77 (Minn. 2015). 
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considered, it must also be confirmed by other evidence.173 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that “traffic studies” and “average 
street numbers” were sufficient evidence to support the 
neighborhood opposition testimony.174 However, the court’s 
analysis of the expert studies focused solely on increased volume of 
traffic. For example, the court considered only “trip generation 
rates” and the “daily number of trips.”175 Thus, the RDNT court, 
unlike the Minnesota Court of Appeals in SuperAmerica, relied on 
specific neighborhood opposition, but no “other concrete 
evidence” regarding the impact of traffic.176 
Ultimately, the RDNT court’s rationale expands the ability of 
neighborhood opposition to influence CUP denials. Conflating 
capacity and livability traffic concerns in considering neighborhood 
opposition testimony undermines a long history of balancing the 
interests of homeowners and developers. Predictability comes from 
limits on discretion, which may strengthen a developer’s ability to 
plan in accordance with zoning law. Furthermore, predictability 
enables developers to create mitigating conditions to improve the 
impact of traffic. Because new development will likely increase the 
volume of traffic, the real concern should be about the impact of 
development on traffic and the ability of the developers to mitigate 
the impact of increased volume and alleviate the burdens of 
existing traffic concerns. 
B. RDNT’s Proposed Mitigating Conditions to Improve Livability 
The Minnesota Supreme Court erred by only considering 
RDNT’s proposed mitigating conditions that would reduce traffic 
volume and not considering proposed improvements that sought 
to manage the impact of traffic. The court considered the 
Campus’s Transportation Demand Management Program (TDMP) 
to determine whether the proposed mitigating conditions would 
exacerbate existing traffic concerns.177 Similar to the court’s 
reliance on increased trip volume by the expert studies, the court 
 
 173.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text.  
 174.  RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77. 
 175.  Id. at 73–74, 76. 
 176.  The court did consider the city’s engineer’s opinion “that the public tends 
to complain once traffic increases to 1,000 trips per day on such a street. Thus . . . 
there is a factual basis in the record . . . .” Id. at 76. 
 177.  Id. at 78.  
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focused specifically on the “measures designed to reduce the 
number of new and existing trips generated by the Campus” in 
analyzing the TDMP.178 
Although the court emphasized that the neighborhood’s 
concerns about livability were paramount, the court did not analyze 
RDNT’s attempts to improve livability.179 Unlike in C.R. Investments 
Inc., where the court analyzed whether “turn-around areas in . . . 
driveways” constituted a “reasonable condition” that would 
eliminate a traffic hazard, the RDNT court did not consider 
conditions that sought to improve the impact of traffic on the 
surrounding neighborhood.180 For example, the court did not 
evaluate the City’s consideration of conditions that sought to 
improve parking, disperse traffic, slow traffic, and improve 
driving.181 Furthermore, distinct from the TDMP, RDNT proposed a 
“Good-Neighbor Policy” to address the impact of traffic on 
surrounding streets.182 The policy involved “constructing speed 
bumps at the facility entrances, encouraging and requiring all 
employees to obey traffic laws, working with Google to achieve 
more accurate and direct online directions, replacing vendors who 
violate the TDMP policies, and retaining a traffic expert to monitor 
the success of its policies.”183 However, there was no analysis 
suggesting why these proposed conditions would be inadequate to 
make the traffic less harmful. Thus, the court did not complete its 
 
 178.  Id. at 74. 
 179.  Id. at 77. However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did address the 
“Good Neighbor Policy” in its opinion; it held that “RDNT already was required by 
a pre-existing CUP to accommodate all vehicles at its facility ‘without on-street 
parking,’ and the record indicates that the campus was unable to comply with this 
condition.” RDNT II, No. A13-0310, 2014 WL 30382, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App.), aff’d, 
861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015). The court of appeals appropriately considered the 
“Good Neighbor Policy,” which moved beyond traffic volume and relates to the 
impact of parking in the residential neighborhood. See id. It is unclear whether the 
other asserted mitigating conditions were addressed by the court of appeals. See id. 
 180.  Compare RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 78–79, with C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of 
Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981). 
 181.  To minimize traffic volume, RDNT offered to “expand the scope of its 
[TDMP] to include, amongst other things, cash incentives for carpooling 
employees, public-transit incentives for visitors, combined vendor deliveries, and 
consolidated delivery times.” Brief & Addendum of Amicus Curiae Ebenezer 
Society at 7, RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015) (No. A13-0310), 2014 WL 
8392645, at *7 [hereinafter Brief of Ebenezer Society]. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
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analysis to determine whether the City denied the permit 
arbitrarily. 
Because the court did not consider whether mitigating 
conditions addressed the neighborhood traffic concerns, this case 
is similar to Northpoint Plaza v. City of Rochester and Tri-City Paving.184 
In both of these cases, the courts held that the city’s CUP denial 
was arbitrary when the city’s decision was based on neighborhood 
opposition and not based on the consideration of new mitigating 
conditions proposed by a developer to meet the city’s demands.185 
In Northpoint Plaza, the city denied a CUP based on neighborhood 
opposition, even after the developer “altered its plans so as to 
comply with all respondent’s requirements.”186 In a somewhat 
different case, Tri-City Paving, the city imposed conditions on a 
developer to “mitigate the negative effects of the noise, dust, and 
trucks, included a 40 mile-per-hour speed limit, road management 
for damage and dust, and operation within limited hours.”187 The 
court held in Tri-City Paving that the city’s decision was arbitrary 
when it denied the CUP despite the developer’s alteration of its 
development plan to accommodate the imposed conditions.188 
In RDNT, although the City did not impose the mitigating 
conditions at issue, RDNT took it upon itself to adapt its 
development plan to address neighborhood traffic concerns.189 
Nonetheless, the neighborhood opposition in RDNT trumped 
consideration of mitigating conditions, just as in the CUP decisions 
 
 184.  See Tri-City Paving, Inc. v. Cass Cty. Planning Comm’n/Bd. of 
Adjustment, No. A11-2054, 2012 WL 4475742 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012); 
Northpointe Plaza v. City of Rochester, 457 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), 
aff’d, 465 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1991). 
 185.  Tri-City Paving, 2012 WL 4475742, at *5; Northpointe Plaza, 457 N.W.2d at 
404. 
 186.  Northpointe, 457 N.W.2d at 401 (“The minutes of the common council 
meeting for January 21, 1986, reflect that Superamerica had altered its plans so as 
to comply with all respondent’s requirements, but that there was still considerable 
opposition to the CUP.”). 
 187.  Tri-City Paving, 2012 WL 4475742, at *4. 
 188.  See id. (“Because the board’s first finding does not address how the 
proposed CUP conditions would not satisfy the stated concerns in the finding and 
because the finding is otherwise not supported by the record, we must deem the 
finding arbitrary.”). 
 189.  Brief of Ebenezer Society, supra note 181, at *7. To mitigate traffic 
concerns, RDNT offered to decrease the total number of units in expansion, 
reduce the building story levels, and increase the set-back, and provided photo 
simulation to show sightlines would not be affected. Id.  
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that brought about Tri-City Paving and Northpoint Plaza, where CUP 
denials were found to be arbitrary.190 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court failed to consider the proposed mitigating conditions as a 
whole. 
C. Impact on Future Decisions and Care Services 
RDNT’s proposed expansion served a quasi-public function by 
providing services to a growing, vulnerable population, which 
illuminates the importance of substantiating neighborhood 
opposition testimony in CUP cases. For instance, RDNT is similar to 
Hanson v. County of Carver Board of Commissioners where the court 
held that a proposed expansion of a current use could exacerbate 
existing traffic concerns resulting from increased volume of traffic, 
which could suffice as a legitimate basis for denial.191 However, 
equating RDNT to Hanson risks equating the nuisances of a mining 
facility to the inconveniences of an elder care facility. While the 
legal standard is the same for both cases, the context of a care 
facility helps illuminate the consequences of an unfair process. 
Assisted living facilities, such as Martin Luther Care Center, 
provide essential care services to residents who can no longer live 
independently—residents who can no longer be independent 
homeowners.192 Broadening the reach of neighborhood opposition 
caters to the “Not in My Backyard” (NIMBY)193 mindset and leaves 
developers of care facilities vulnerable to unsubstantiated traffic 
 
 190.  See RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 78 (Minn. 2015) (considering only the 
proposed mitigating conditions that targeted the “minimization of the trip volume 
by the proposed Traffic Demand Management Plan”). 
 191.  See Hanson v. Cty. of Carver Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A05-2047, 2006 WL 
2598283, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006). In Hanson, the CUP applicant 
proposed to expand a mining operation, which would increase the number of 
trucks where trucks were already causing considerable nuisance to the 
surrounding neighborhood, namely from “[t]ruck noise and ‘jake braking’ . . . 
dust and noise generated by current traffic . . . the lack of turn lanes and traffic 
controls of nearby intersections have already caused delays . . . .” Id. at *3. 
 192.  See RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 72–73. 
 193.  See Michael Kling, Zoned Out: Assisted-Living Facilities and Zoning, 10 ELDER 
L.J. 187, 196 (2002) (discussing the “NIMBY Phenomenon”); see also FISCHEL, supra 
note 40, at 9–10 (“NIMBYism is weird only if you think solely about the rationally 
expected outcome from development. NIMBYism makes perfectly good sense if 
you think about the variance in expected outcomes, and the fact that there is no 
way to insure against neighborhood or community-wide decline.”).   
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impact allegations.194 The effects of RDNT have already been seen 
in Minnesota. 
LifeSpan of Minnesota, a Youth Transition Program that 
provides day treatment services to school age children ranging 
from five to eighteen years of age, applied for a CUP to build a 
mental health facility for children, but the city denied the permit 
due to neighborhood opposition.195 LifeSpan worries that the 
process of building and expanding facilities for essential services 
will “become political” if cities can “rely on anecdotal statements of 
prospective neighbors.”196 As demonstrated by LifeSpan’s 
experience, RDNT has already impacted CUP permit decisions in 
Minnesota.197 
The experiences of RDNT and LifeSpan represent an 
emerging trend of CUP denials for care facilities. The RDNT 
decision may make it more difficult for care services to meet the 
needs of vulnerable Minnesotans.198 As the elderly population 
increases and the market shifts,199 the need for assisted living 
facilities will increase.200 The aging population is demanding the 
 
 194.  See, e.g., HERBERT INHABER, SLAYING THE NIMBY DRAGON 5–9 (1998) 
(discussing the NIMBY concept and how neighborhood opposition has prevented 
the development of daycare facilities, AIDS treatment facilities, small group homes 
for mentally ill patients, affordable housing, and homeless shelters). 
 195.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Lifespan of Minnesota, Inc., RDNT III, 861 
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015) (No. A13-0310), 2014 WL 8392640, at *1–3. 
 196.  Id. at *3. 
 197.  See id. at *1. 
 198.  Kling argues that an unfortunate “pattern” has formed because assisted-
living facilities “tend to arouse much local opposition and typically end with a 
permit denial by the local zoning board.” Kling, supra note 193, at 203. According 
to Kling, this pattern has forced courts to “step in to counteract the local 
government.” Id. 
 199.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Aging Services of Minnesota, RDNT III, 861 
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015) (No. 0310), 2014 WL 8392644, at *10 [hereinafter Brief 
of Aging Services] (“Minnesotans ‘are expecting and demanding more choice over 
their long-term care. This trend is expected to accelerate as baby boomers, the 
first real “consumer” generation, grow old and need care.’” (quoting MINN. DEPT. 
OF HUMAN SERVS., STATUS OF LONG-TERM CARE IN MINNESOTA 2005: A REPORT TO 
THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE 4 (June 2006), http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs 
/2006/Mandated/060432.pdf)). 
 200.  Brief of Aging Services, supra note 199, at *2–3. (“In 2011, the first wave 
of baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) began to turn 65, and for 
the next 30 years this cohort will profoundly affect the business of senior care.”); 
see, e.g., Bayan Raji, Rise of Baby Boomers is Changing the Assisted Living Landscape, 
HOUS. BUS. J. (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/print-edition 
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ability to “age in place,”201 and the court’s decision may impair the 
ability of facilities to meet this demand. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The history of American zoning demonstrates how changing 
American ideals have demanded protection of the single-family 
home, greater flexibility in zoning, and limits to municipal 
discretion through more express standards. Tools of flexibility 
emerged to adapt to changing urban demands that were frustrated 
by the rigidities of the original model of Euclidean zoning. 
However, these devices, including CUPs, opened a debate about 
the appropriate degree of municipal discretion. 
Closer judicial analysis is due when weighing public concerns 
in CUP denials.202 Rather than always deferring to local governing 
bodies about decisions based on traffic and allegedly injurious uses, 
courts have helped interpret (1) what constitutes traffic that is 
“injurious” to the general welfare, (2) whether neighborhood 
traffic concerns alone can be grounds for denial, and (3) whether 
ignoring mitigating conditions to improve traffic impact constitutes 
an arbitrary denial.203 These are all issues that restrict the discretion 
of municipal decision makers and limit deference to legislature. 
The RDNT decision increased the ability of local governing 
bodies to (1) deny CUP applications on the basis of neighborhood 
opposition alone and (2) disregard proposed mitigating conditions 
that may improve traffic conditions in a neighborhood.204 While 
neighborhood opposition testimony often seeks to protect the 
important financial interest of the single-family homeowner, 
allowing this testimony to go unsubstantiated risks restricting 
otherwise permissible uses too broadly. Furthermore, enabling 
municipalities to ignore proposed mitigating conditions that may 
 
/2013/08/30/the-rise-of-baby-boomers-is-changing.html (discussing growing 
demand to age in place). 
 201.  “Aging in place” refers to a growing industry trend where “[m]any 
seniors choose campuses where a full continuum of care is offered to individuals 
to meet their variety of needs.” Brief of Aging Services, supra note 199, at *9; see 
also Rebecca C. Morgan, What the Future of Aging Means to All of Us: An Era of 
Possibilities, 48 IND. L. REV. 125, 131 (2014) (discussing the changing paradigms 
and demands for elder housing and care). 
 202.  See supra Part IV. 
 203.  See supra Parts II.D, IV. 
 204.  See supra Part IV. 
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improve traffic livability and alleviate concerns undermines the 
ability of developers to address concerns from neighbors in 
development proposals. 
The policy considerations regarding decreased access to elder 
care are not the reason that the court should have held in RDNT’s 
favor, but rather are an indicator of the importance of balancing 
property interests. When essential residential and nursing care 
services are at stake, it is more readily apparent that while 
deference to legislature is important, so is a fair process. 
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